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Prioritizing Demand Response: How Federal Legislation 
and Technological Innovation Changed the Electricity 
Supply Market and the Need to Revitalize FERC Order 745 
Bradley J. McAlllister* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The wholesale electric power network, or grid, delivers the product on which 
modern life depends, but it is the last major network to hold out against 
fundamental change.1 Over the past ten years, the federal government has 
committed billions of dollars to update the nation’s grid.2 These updates are 
redefining the way electric power is sold and creating business opportunities for 
new entrants in the power supply market.3 However, new entrants are facing strong 
opposition from traditional power utilities and independent power producers.4 In 
May 2014, a coalition of power companies successfully overturned an 
administrative order promulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
(“FERC”) to promote competition in the wholesale market for electricity.5 Now, 
the nation’s largest grid operator faces a legal challenge to remove more than $9 
                                                          
* J.D. Candidate, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2016. The author is pursuing a 
concentration in energy and environmental law. He would like to thank the staff and editorial team from 
the Journal of Technology Law & Policy for their contributions to this Note. The author would also like 
to thank his family, friends, and professors for their inspiration and support. 
1 Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
1, 3 (2013). 
2 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY GRID: 
ENABLING OUR SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 10 (2011) [hereinafter SECURE ENERGY WHITEPAPER], 
available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/nstc-smart-grid-june2011 
.pdf. 
3 See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Complaint of 
FirstEnergy Service Co., FERC Docket No. EL14-55-000 (May 23, 2014); Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. 
F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014), petition for rehearing en banc of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 
at 6 (July 7, 2014)) [hereinafter PJM petition for rehearing en banc]. 
4 Id. 
5 See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also Demand 
Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Order No. 745, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658 
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billion of electricity supply from its network.6 In response, FERC petitioned the 
U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in January 2015, arguing that the D.C. 
Circuit construed FERC’s authority too narrowly and that the value of electricity 
supply from new entrants is critical to the nation’s interest.7 If the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision is upheld, technological progress will be stifled and electricity consumers 
will miss out on revolutionary new ways to interact with the power market that will 
reduce overall costs and increase transparency in electricity pricing. 
Electric power generators spend billions of dollars annually to operate what 
are known as “peaking plants.” These plants provide a reserve supply during 
extreme temperatures or unplanned surges in demand, but are otherwise rarely 
used.8 The traditional way that wholesale-market operators meet unexpected spikes 
in demand for electricity is by adding more electricity supply to the grid by 
generating additional megawatts.9 However, incremental increases in generation 
can be enormously expensive during unexpected increases in demand, such as hot 
summer days.10 Since electricity is not currently stored in an economically viable 
manner, the grid must call on the most expensive and inefficient power plants to 
meet the unanticipated peak demand.11 
An alternative way to balance the ever-changing supply of electricity on the 
grid is to decrease demand.12 While traditional power generators produce 
megawatts, reductions in consumer demand create “negawatts,” a unit that 
measures the amount of energy that has been saved through any given conservation 
or electrical efficiency effort.13 An emerging energy efficiency program enables 
electricity consumers to sell reductions in electricity demand to grid operators, a 
program that has come to be known as demand response (“DR”).14 DR is a cost-
                                                          
6 Complaint of FirstEnergy Service Co., FERC No. EL14-55-000 (May 23, 2014); see also PJM 
petition for rehearing en banc, supra note 3. 
7 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216, 226 (D.C. 
Cir. 2014) (No. 14-840) [hereinafter FERC petition for cert.]. 
8 SECURE ENERGY WHITEPAPER, supra note 2, at 31. 




13 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216, 226 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Edwards, J., 
dissenting). 
14 Diane Cardwell & Matthew L. Wald, Legal Fight Pits Sellers of Energy Against Buyers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/business/energy-environment/legal-fight-
pits-sellers-of-energy-against-buyers.html?_r=1. 
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effective regulatory policy and business model used to offset the need to fire up the 
most costly power generators that only operate on a few days per year.15 It has been 
referred to as the “safety valve” of the modern grid.16 
DR works by paying energy consumers for commitments to reduce their 
electricity consumption during peak demand periods, a time when energy is the 
most expensive.17 Smoothing these expensive peaks is the primary goal of these 
new entrants into the energy market, known as DR aggregators.18 DR aggregators 
reduce operating costs for grid operators, provide savings to electricity consumers, 
and add value by contracting with several electricity consumers at once to supply 
additional capacity to the grid at peak times.19 
Barriers to entry in the electricity market have collapsed.20 Independent power 
producers are no longer excluded by the cost-prohibitive infrastructure required to 
compete in the traditional electricity supply market.21 Instead, their competitive 
advantage rests on algorithms, sensors, processing power, and effective 
marketing.22 As such, advancements in smart grid technology have created a new 
market for DR aggregation companies that reduce electricity demand in peak hours 
and sell that voluntary reduction in power back to the national grid.23 The services 
offered by these new entrants into the electricity market undercut the traditional 
business model of utilities.24 The DR aggregator supplies additional electricity in a 
transformative new way: energy efficiency.25 Likening themselves to virtual power 
                                                          
15 Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?: FERC’s Authority Over Demand Response 
Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69, 74–75 
(2013). 
16 Id. at 78. 
17 FERC petition for cert., supra note 7. 
18 SECURE ENERGY WHITEPAPER, supra note 2, at 31. 
19 Id. 
20 New Business Models All Change: The Power Industry’s Main Concern Has Always Been 





23 Cardwell & Wald, supra note 14. 
24 Id. 
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plants,26 DR aggregators are independent power producers that pay energy 
consumers to reduce their demand at critical times of grid instability and sell the 
aggregated load reduction to grid operators, who in turn pay them for the capacity 
delivered.27 Firms such as EnerNOC serve as intermediaries for the wholesale 
energy market by enabling commercial, industrial, and residential electricity 
consumers to sell reductions in power usage to grid operators in exchange for a 
payment.28 EnerNOC sells reductions in demand, called DR resources, to the grid. 
On the national level, DR has the potential to reduce market prices for 
electricity, while mitigating generator market power, and increasing competition 
for DR aggregators and other clean-tech developments in the private sector. With 
additional DR resources, instead of the most costly generation resources, wholesale 
prices are lower at peak times.29 The impact of additional supply resources from 
DR is greatest during peak hours when the marginal cost of generation is the 
highest, resulting in the highest prices to consumers.30 Thus, more DR amounts to 
greater cost savings for electricity consumers because a less costly form of power 
supply is substituted for the most expensive form of power generation. Further, the 
ability to reduce demand at peak times mitigates blackout conditions in regional 
grids, which lies squarely within the national interest because of the threat to 
economic and social welfare caused by electricity blackouts.31 Additionally, DR 
shares little or none of the negative externalities that traditional peak capacity 
generation resources exhibit, such as air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions, and 
land and water use.32 
In 2011, FERC issued Administrative Order 745 to promote the participation 
of DR aggregators and the sale of DR resources in wholesale electric markets.33 
                                                          
26 ENERNOC, What is Demand Response (Dec. 30, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://www.enernoc.com/ 
our-resources/term-pages/what-is-demand-response (additional names used to describe companies 
providing DR resources include curtailment service providers or load servicing entities). 
27 SIEMENS, Enrolling with a Demand Response Aggregator (Dec. 29, 2014, 4:00 PM), https:// 
w3.usa.siemens.com/buildingtechnologies/us/en/energy-efficiency/demand-response/Documents/BT_ 
DR_aggregatorwhitepaper.pdf. 
28 Eisen, supra note 15, at 80. 
29 Id. at 78. 
30 Id. 
31 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Assessment of Demand Response & Advanced 
Metering Staff Report (2013), available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/12-20-12-demand-
response.pdf. 
32 Eisen, supra note 15, at 78. 
33 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (Mar. 15, 2011). 
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Under the Federal Power Act (“FPA”), FERC is empowered to regulate the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of electric 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.34 Under § 201 of the FPA, FERC’s 
jurisdiction extends “only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by 
the states.”35 FERC has the authority to issue administrative orders to ensure just 
and reasonable rates for the sale of electricity at wholesale in interstate 
commerce.36 Order 745 is a marginal cost pricing mechanism under which “the 
price to withdraw electric power . . . at each location in the grid at any given time 
reflects the cost of making available an additional unit of electric power for 
purchase at that location and time.”37 In issuing Order 745, FERC reasoned the sale 
of DR resources in the wholesale market promotes just and reasonable wholesale 
rates: “demand response helps to ensure the competitiveness of organized 
wholesale energy markets and remove barriers to the participation of demand 
response resources, thus ensuring just and reasonable wholesale rates.”38 
Order 745 treats DR as functionally comparable to generation in the 
organized wholesale energy market. Equivalent pricing is appropriate because DR 
is capable of balancing supply and demand just as traditional forms of generation 
can.39 Applying this logic, reducing demand for electricity by 1,000 megawatts 
through DR is just as effective as producing 1,000 megawatts of supply via a coal-
fired electricity plant to meet demand.40 In operation, Order 745 effectively 
prioritizes DR as the first type of electricity to be dispatched by regional grid 
operators because it is the supply equivalent to traditional generation as well as a 
preferable alternative due to its ability to provide electricity faster, cleaner, and 
more efficiently. Industry commentators to the notice and proposed rulemaking for 
Order 745 suggested that the unique characteristics of DR, including the rapid 
dispatchability of the resource and its ability to stabilize the grid in periods of 
unexpected peak demand, are even more valuable than an equivalent increase in 
                                                          
34 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
35 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012). 
36 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012). 
37 Eisen, supra note 15, at 85 (quoting Electric Energy Mkt. Competition Task Force, Report to 
Congress on Competition in Wholesale and Retail Markets for Electric Energy: Pursuant to Section 
1815 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, at 58 (2006)); see also Amended and Restated Operating 
Agreement of PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., Rate Schedule FERC No. 24, § 1.19 (defining “Locational 
Marginal Price” or “LMP” as the hourly integrated market clearing marginal price for energy at the 
location the energy is delivered or received). 
38 FERC Order 745, supra note 5, at 1. 
39 Id. at 52; see also Eisen, supra note 15, at 77–79. 
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generation.41 Under Order 745, now vacated, DR resources would be compensated 
at the locational marginal price (“LMP”), the cost of generation at that specific 
location on the grid, to encourage DR as a more efficient means to supply 
electricity to the grid at peak demand.42 
On May 23, 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit ruled FERC overstepped its jurisdictional authority and 
encroached on the retail market when it passed Order 745.43 The D.C. Circuit 
vacated Order 745 in its entirety as an ultra vires agency action, holding that sales 
of DR are retail transactions and therefore subject to the jurisdictional authority of 
the states under the FPA.44 On the same day as the D.C. Circuit’s ruling, 
FirstEnergy Solutions, an Ohio corporation, filed a claim against PJM 
Interconnection (“PJM”), the nation’s largest grid operator, before FERC seeking 
to remove all portions of the PJM ratemaking structure allowing or requiring PJM 
to include DR aggregators as suppliers in the PJM capacity market.45 Now, the 
jurisdictional ratemaking authority over DR aggregators in wholesale electric 
markets is uncertain, and PJM faces a legal challenge to remove all DR resources 
from its grid.46 According to FirstEnergy, if PJM’s May 2014 capacity auction 
removed DR resources from the grid and that difference is annualized, prices to 
electricity consumers in the PJM market may increase by $9.3 billion.47 
This Note argues that a unified compensation and regulatory scheme, as 
proposed under FERC Order 745, is critical to harness the full potential of DR 
resources and the multiple benefits that DR offers, such as increased national and 
regional grid reliability, increased competition in the electricity supply industry, 
and auxiliary benefits including reductions in pollution and reductions in wasted 
energy from inefficient power generation. In its decision, the U.S. Supreme Court 
should reverse the ruling of the D.C. Circuit and hold FERC has jurisdiction over 
DR in wholesale markets under a proper interpretation of the FPA because DR 
transactions directly affect the wholesale market. Alternatively, if the Supreme 
                                                          
41 Id. at 78–79. 
42 Id. at 77–79. 
43 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
44 Id. (Ultra vires, literally “beyond the powers” in Latin, is defined as “unauthorized; beyond the 
scope of power allowed or granted by a corporate charter or by law” in Black’s Law Dictionary (10th 
ed. 2014)); see 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012). 
45 Complaint of FirstEnergy Service Co., FERC No. EL14-55-000 (May 23, 2014). 
46 Id.; see also PJM petition for rehearing en banc, supra note 3, at 6. 
47 Bruce W. Radford, $9 Billion at Risk, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 2014, at 4. 
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Court upholds the ruling of the D.C. Circuit, then Congress must act to protect the 
federal taxpayer investment in the modern smart grid and draft new legislation to 
promote competition and provide access for technology-based participants in 
electricity markets. 
This Note is presented in three parts. Part I explains the key federal legislation 
and government programs that, over the past decade, built the modern electricity 
grid and created the market for DR in wholesale markets. Part II discusses recent 
technological advances and economic conditions in the electricity market that 
provide new opportunities for grid operators, DR aggregators, and energy 
consumers. Part III argues that courts have interpreted the FPA more broadly in 
similar cases of mixed federal-state jurisdiction over electricity markets, and the 
Supreme Court must do the same to find Order 745 is within FERC’s jurisdictional 
grant of authority. 
II. LEGISLATIVE FOUNDATIONS FOR SMART GRID DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE EVOLUTION OF DR 
The federal and state governments share jurisdiction over the electricity 
system in the United States.48 The boundaries of federal jurisdiction remain 
grounded in the Federal Power Act of 1935.49 Under the FPA, FERC regulates the 
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of electric 
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.50 Advances in technology have 
dramatically changed the market for power generation in the United States since 
the FPA was enacted in 1935.51 Over the past ten years, federal lawmakers have 
worked hard to keep pace with technology in the wholesale market for electricity. 
Recent legislation highlights the congressional intent to invest in smart grid 
infrastructure, increase competition in wholesale electricity markets, and promote 
DR.52 Indeed, this “smart grid” aims to capitalize on technological advancements in 
order to overhaul an existing grid built to restrict competition and transparency in 
electricity markets.53 
                                                          
48 Andrew H. Meyer, Federal Regulatory Barriers to Grid-Deployed Energy Storage, 39 COLUM. 
J. ENVTL. L. 479, 505 (2014). 
49 Id. 
50 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
51 New York v. F.E.R.C., 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002). 
52 SECURE ENERGY WHITEPAPER, supra note 2, at 1–7. 
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Building the smart grid requires both new technologies and transformative 
regulatory change.54 In 2009, the Department of Energy (“DOE”) stated in its first 
biennial report to Congress that the smart grid may transform America as much as 
the Internet has done, redefining every aspect of electricity generation, distribution, 
and use.55 The goal of increasing investment in U.S. energy infrastructure is well 
founded.56 At peak times, the power grid is stressed. Like a rubber band stretched 
to the limit, supply is strained to meet peak demand.57 Under certain circumstances, 
that strain leads to service disruptions, such as forced outages or rolling 
blackouts.58 The most notable recent infrastructure failure was the blackout of 
August 2003, which left more than 50 million people in the Great Lakes, New 
England, and Mid-Atlantic regions of the United States, as well as certain areas in 
Canada, without power and caused $10 billion in damage in the United States 
alone.59 Such failures cause a ripple effect of disruption and damage far beyond the 
energy industry alone, because of the substantial economic investments that are 
based on electricity being available at predicted levels and costs.60 
A. How DR Works in the Electricity Grid 
The efforts to develop a smart grid have two objectives: updating the grid’s 
outdated infrastructure with advanced hardware and software; and providing 
electricity consumers with transformative ways to make, use, and conserve 
electricity.61 The two objectives are mutually dependent. Electricity consumers 
generally lack the information or incentive to alter their electricity use during peak 
demand, when the cost of electricity is the highest.62 More hardware installed on 
the grid promotes greater network interoperability and two-way communication 
between electricity suppliers and electricity consumers.63 Additionally, the federal 
government has encouraged states to develop markets for time-varying rates that 
                                                          
54 Id. at 3. 
55 Id. at 6. 
56 Joshua P. Fershee, Misguided Energy: Why Recent Legislative, Regulatory, and Market 
Initiatives are Insufficient to Improve the U.S. Energy Infrastructure, 44 HARV. J. LEGIS. 327 (2007). 
57 Eisen, supra note 15, at 78. 
58 Id. 
59 Fershee, supra note 56, at 328. 
60 Fershee, supra note 56, at 328 (quoting Robert C. Fellmeth, Plunging Into Darkness: Energy 
Deregulation Collides with Scarcity, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 823, 825, 830 (2002)). 
61 Eisen, supra note 1, at 3. 
62 SECURE ENERGY WHITEPAPER, supra note 2, at 31. 
63 Id. 
    
 
 
J o u r n a l  o f  T e c h n o l o g y  L a w  &  P o l i c y  
Volume XV – Spring 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










more accurately capture the hour-to-hour variations in the cost of supplying 
electricity.64 
With real-time data on energy consumption and regional energy needs 
supplied by DR aggregators, grid operators and energy consumers have more 
opportunities to capitalize on advanced data monitoring created by the smart grid.65 
DR aggregators sell voluntary reductions in power at times of peak demand, where 
the marginal cost and dispatch speed of additional supply directly impacts the 
market clearing price for energy.66 Experts and grid operators value participation 
by DR aggregators because these companies make electricity service more reliable 
and lower overall consumer costs, as grid operators buy less of the most expensive 
power to meet peak demand needs.67 These virtual power plants provide cost 
savings to consumers, while delivering efficient and reliable electricity supply to 
grid operators.68 
As a consequence of technological, legislative, and regulatory changes over 
the last two decades, much of the nation’s wholesale electricity market is now run 
by regional nonprofit entities.69 There are currently six independent grid operators 
in the United States that control the wholesale market for electricity and are subject 
to federal jurisdiction.70 These regional nonprofit entities set the rates for wholesale 
purchases of electricity by matching supply and demand in real-time and day-ahead 
markets.71 
PJM is the largest centrally dispatched power market in the world and the 
largest Regional Transmission Organization (“RTO”), or regional grid operator, in 
the United States.72 PJM ensures the continuous flow of electricity for 61 million 
                                                          
64 Id. 
65 SECURE ENERGY WHITEPAPER, supra note 2, at 30–31. 
66 Meyer, supra note 48, at 522. 
67 Diane Cardwell & Matthew L. Wald, Legal Fight Pits Sellers of Energy Against Buyers, N.Y. 
TIMES (Nov. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/27/business/energy-environment/legal-fight-
pits-sellers-of-energy-against-buyers.html?_r=1. 
68 Eisen, supra note 15, at 75. 
69 FERC petition for cert., supra note 7. 
70 Meyer, supra note 48, at 507–08 n.144 (“The following RTOs and ISOs are subject to FERC: 
PJM Interconnection, LLC (‘PJM’); New York Independent System Operator, Inc. (‘NYISO’); Midwest 
Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc. (‘MISO’); ISO New England Inc. (‘ISO-NE’); 
California Independent System Operator Corp. (‘CAISO’); and Southwest Power Pool, Inc. (‘SPP’)”); 
see FERC petition for cert., supra note 7. 
71 FERC petition for cert., supra note 7. 
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people across 13 states and the District of Columbia.73 Its mission is to deliver cost-
efficient and reliable electricity service to energy consumers.74 Given the 
operation’s heightened importance, grid operators at PJM receive military-like 
training for their daunting task.75 They manage the continuous flow of electricity 
throughout the interstate grid, dispatching energy in real-time to where it is needed 
most.76 
The RTO facilitates the interstate sales of electricity products, including 
energy and capacity, by managing marketplaces where those products may be 
exchanged.77 DR aggregators, including EnerNOC, participate in the wholesale 
market for electricity in the states in which PJM operates.78 PJM has made 
tremendous investments in grid upgrades and DR resources.79 While utilities have 
offered DR programs for decades, they have underinvested in them because the 
utility is in effect anti-selling its product, and states traditionally reward utilities for 
increased sales.80 
Barriers to entry in the PJM marketplace for energy generation and ancillary 
economic services have receded in the past 15 years as new membership in PJM’s 
                                                          
73 PJM 2013 Annual Report, Building Resilience 8 (Oct. 23, 2014, 10:00 PM) [hereinafter PJM 
2013 Annual Report], available at http://www.pjm.com/about-pjm/who-we-are/annual-report.aspx; see 
also PJM, Territory Served (Jan. 24, 2015, 12:00 AM), available at http://www.pjm.com/about-
pjm/who-we-are/territory-served.aspx (stating PJM coordinates the movement of electricity through all 
or parts of Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia). 
74 PJM 2013 Annual Report, at 8 (Oct. 23, 2014, 10:00 PM); see also PJM, Territory Served 
(Jan. 24, 2015, 12:00 AM); see also PJM, PJM’s Mission and Vision, available at http://www.pjm.com/ 
about-pjm/who-we-are/mission-vision.aspx (stating PJM’s mission as follows: “As the primary task, to 
ensure the safety, reliability and security of the bulk electric power system. Create and operate robust, 
competitive and non-discriminatory electric power markets. Understand customer needs and deliver 
valued service to meet those needs in a cost-efficient manner. Achieve productivity through the efficient 
union of superior knowledge workers and technology advances.”). 
75 See Matthew L. Wald, On the Front Lines of the Power Grid, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2011), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/26/business/energy-environment/ behind-the-power-grid-
humans-with-high-stakes-jobs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
76 PPL Energy Plus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2014). 
77 Id. 
78 PJM Member List, Sortable List of PJM members (Jan. 24, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://www 
.pjm.com/about-pjm/member-services/member-list.aspx. 
79 Michael Milligan, Erik Ela, Jeff Hein, Thomas Schneider, Gregory Brinkman & Paul Denholm, 
Renewable Electricity Futures Study, Volume 4: Exploration Bulk Electric Power Systems: Operations 
and Transmission Planning, National Renewable Energy Laboratory, 29-2; 29-3 (2012). 
80 Eisen, supra note 1, at 12. 
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wholesale market has increased dramatically.81 In 2003, PJM had a total of 250 
members that contributed to the energy business cycle through transmission, 
generation, distribution, and other supplier services.82 There were 879 members by 
the end of 2013 and currently there are 940 members.83 
B. Federal Legislation and National Policy to Support DR 
With the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct”), Congress 
established a national policy to eliminate unnecessary barriers to DR participation 
in organized wholesale energy markets.84 The EPAct added new provisions to 
§ 132(a) of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (“PURPA”) to 
promote federal assistance for advanced metering and communications 
technologies in DR programs.85 The EPAct ensures that DR plays a role on the 
agenda of the federal government, as the legislation orders FERC to publish an 
annual report, by region, to assess DR resources.86 FERC has published an annual 
report on DR resources and advanced metering infrastructure (“AMI”) since 
2006.87 AMI is an integrated system of technologically advanced meters, 
communications networks, and data management systems that enable two-way 
communication between utilities and consumers via the smart grid.88 AMI serves as 
the building blocks for the smart grid and the foundation for new technologies like 
DR. 
Two years after its enactment of the EPAct, Congress passed the Energy 
Independence and Security Act of 2007 (“EISA”) and declared it the policy of the 
United States to support the modernization of the electrical grid.89 Specifically, the 
                                                          
81 PJM 2013 Annual Report, supra note 73, at 28. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 16 U.S.C. § 1252(f) (2012) (“It is the policy of the United States that time-based pricing and 
other forms of demand response, whereby electricity customers are provided with electricity price 
signals and the ability to benefit by responding to them, shall be encouraged, the deployment of such 
technology and devices that enable electricity customers to participate in such pricing and demand 
response system shall be facilitated, and unnecessary barriers to demand response participation in 
energy, capacity and ancillary service markets shall be eliminated.”). 
85 16 U.S.C. § 1252(c) (2012). 
86 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1252(e)(3), 119 Stat. 594; see FEDERAL 
ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & ADVANCED METERING 
STAFF REPORT 1 (2013) [hereinafter ASSESSMENT], available at http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-
reports/2013/oct-demand-response.pdf. 
87 Id. 
88 Eisen, supra note 1, at 10. 
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EISA introduced ten characteristics of the smart grid that the United States must 
achieve in order to maintain a reliable and secure electricity infrastructure ready to 
meet future demand growth.90 Similar to the EPAct, the EISA calls for increased 
research and development of technologies to capture efficiency savings from 
advanced metering and improve grid communication through AMI.91 The EISA 
established the Smart Grid Investment Grant (“SGIG”) program, a federal 
matching fund for smart grid investment, which provided up to a 50% 
reimbursement for qualifying private investments.92 Federal grant programs like the 
SGIG encouraged auxiliary growth in the private sector. Private investment in AMI 
technology has prompted a revolution in clean-tech, and the consulting firm 
Navigant Research forecasts that the global smart city technology market will be 
worth $20.2 billion annually by 2020.93 
In the wake of a depressed economy, Congress passed the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (“Recovery Act”).94 The Recovery Act 
provided the single largest smart grid investment in U.S. history when it funded the 
SGIG program within the DOE.95 The SGIG received $4.5 billion in federal 
funding, matched by an additional $4.5 billion investment from the private sector.96 
AMI projects funded through the DOE’s SGIG program have added 15 million 
                                                          
90 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 17381 (2007) (this section is 
entitled: Statement of policy on modernization of electricity grid and it states “It is the policy of the 
United States to support the modernization of the Nation’s electricity transmission and distribution 
system to maintain a reliable and secure electricity infrastructure that can meet future demand growth 
and to achieve each of the following, which together characterize a Smart Grid: (1) Increased use of 
digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric 
grid; (2) Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber-security; 
(3) Development and integration of distributed resources and generation, including renewable resources; 
(4) Development and incorporation of demand response, demand-side resources, and energy-efficiency 
resources; (5) Deployment of ‘smart’ technologies (real-time, automated, interactive technologies that 
optimize the physical operation of appliances and consumer devices) for metering, communications and 
status, and distribution automation; (6) Integration of “smart” appliances and consumer devices; 
(7) Deployment and integration of advanced electricity storage and peak-shaving technologies, 
including plug-in electric and hybrid electric vehicles, and thermal-storage air conditioning; 
(8) Provision to consumers of timely information and control options; (9) Development of standards for 
communication and interoperability of appliances and equipment connected to the electric grid, 
including the infrastructure serving the grid; (10) Identification and lowering of unreasonable or 
unnecessary barriers to adoption of smart grid technologies, practices, and services.”). 
91 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 17384 (2007). 
92 Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 17386 (2007). 
93 Smart City Tracker 1Q13, NAVIGANT CONSULTING (Sept. 27, 2014, 12:00 PM), http://www 
.navigantresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/TR-SCIT-1Q13_Navigant_Research_Brochure.pdf. 
94 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
95 SECURE ENERGY WHITEPAPER, supra note 2, at v. 
96 Id. 
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smart meters to the grid since 2010.97 The purpose of the grant program was to 
support the transition to a smarter, stronger, and more efficient and reliable electric 
system.98 More recently, the Executive Office of the President issued a White Paper 
to encourage participants in the United States to take advantage of opportunities 
made possible by modern information, energy, and communications technology 
based on four pillars: (1) enabling cost-effective smart grid investments, 
(2) unlocking the potential for innovation in the electric sector, (3) empowering 
consumers and enabling them to make informed decisions, and (4) securing the 
grid.99 The preceding laws set the foundation for the enactment of FERC Order 745 
in 2011. 
C. FERC Order 745: Demand Response Compensation in Organized 
Wholesale Energy Markets 
In promulgating Order 745, FERC recognized the tension between federal and 
state authority over the smart grid, stating, “[j]urisdiction over demand response is 
a complex matter that lies at the confluence of state and federal jurisdiction.”100 
Specifically, §§ 205 and 206 of the FPA grant FERC the authority to ensure all 
rates and charges for the transmission or sale for resale of electric energy in 
interstate commerce, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such 
rates or charges, are just and reasonable.101 FERC rooted its jurisdictional authority 
over DR in organized wholesale energy markets, based on the fact that the sale of 
DR resources directly affects wholesale rates.102 Moreover, FERC acknowledged 
that a unified approach to DR compensation is necessary to overcome barriers to 
entry for DR aggregators, as opposed to regional or state-by-state payment 
variations, that might valuate DR below the LMP.103 Commentators in support of 
Order 745 argued that a uniform compensation level is needed to provide a catalyst 
for private sector engagement in improved energy management practices.104 
                                                          
97 Advanced Metering Infrastructure and Customer Systems: Smart Meters Deployed, available at 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/deployment_status/ami_and_customer_systems##SmartMeters
Deployed (data updated to Q3 2014) (accessed Oct. 5, 2014 3:44 PM). 
98 SECURE ENERGY WHITEPAPER, supra note 2, at v. 
99 Id. 
100 FERC Order 745, supra note 5, at 86. 
101 16 U.S.C. §§ 824e(a), 824d(a) (2012) (emphasis added). 
102 FERC Order 745, supra note 5, at 86. 
103 Id. at 35–37. 
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With unprecedented support from the federal government to develop smart 
grid technologies, remove barriers to competition, and encourage consumer 
involvement in the smart grid, FERC issued Order 745. By enacting Order 745, 
FERC amended its regulations under the FPA to ensure that when a DR resource 
participating in an organized wholesale energy market has the capability to balance 
supply and demand as an alternative to a generation resource, that DR resource is 
compensated at the LMP: the market price for an additional megawatt of 
electricity.105 FERC determined that compensating DR resources at the cost of 
generation at the LMP would ensure the competitiveness of organized wholesale 
energy markets and remove barriers to the participation of DR resources, thus 
ensuring just and reasonable wholesale rates.106 The issuance of Order 745 also 
ensures that inconsistent compensation for DR in the wholesale power market 
would not inhibit meaningful participation from DR aggregators on the supply side 
and electricity consumers on the demand side.107 But Order 745 is not simply about 
providing electricity generation supply at the lowest possible cost. DR resources 
provide additional benefits that increase grid operability at the most critical 
times.108 
Order 745 mandates that when an RTO or Independent Service Operator 
(ISO) dispatches DR resources, the price for the additional energy is paid at the 
LMP.109 The LMP is the price calculated by the ISO or RTO at particular locations 
or electrical nodes or zones within the ISO or RTO footprint and it functions as the 
market price to compensate generators for additional units of power at that location 
on the grid.110 FERC also established a net benefits test to guide grid operators in 
determining whether they should dispatch DR.111 The net benefits test is a cost-
benefit calculation to guide RTOs and ISOs when it is economically efficient to 
dispatch DR resources to the grid.112 The net benefits test is a safeguard that takes 
                                                          
105 Id. at 38–39. 
106 Id. at 46–47. 
107 Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 75 FR 15362 (Mar. 29, 2010), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 35,656 (2010). 
108 Eisen, supra note 15, at 73. 
109 FERC Order 745, supra note 5, at 39. 
110 Id. at 2 n.5. 
111 Id. at 61–64. 
112 Id. at 62–63 (stating that the RTO or ISO should determine the threshold price corresponding 
to the point along the supply stack for each month beyond which the benefit to load from the reduced 
LMP resulting from dispatching DR resources exceeds the increased cost to load associated with the 
billing unit effect, and update the calculation monthly). 
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into account the totality of the circumstances surrounding a peak demand event and 
the need to obtain additional power quickly. Under the net benefits test, the grid 
operator relies on a pre-calculated threshold price to determine at what point the 
dispatch of DR will stabilize the LMP and prevent it from rising.113 Thus, Order 
745 prioritizes the dispatch of DR when it is cost-effective for grid operators to use 
the resource because it mitigates price spikes in the LMP at peak demand. 
Moreover, an additional unit of DR may be dispatched more quickly than 
traditional generation, and with fewer negative externalities, because deploying DR 
resources is achieved when energy consumers turn off their power or use less 
electricity. 
For years, FERC has largely defined its regulatory role as fostering 
competition in electricity generation and promoting the sale of electricity at its 
lowest cost.114 Order 745 requires DR to be compensated at the cost of generation 
because it impacts system-wide prices and reliability, in addition to other social and 
environmental benefits.115 Experts argue that FERC is well within its 
administrative authority to promote DR on the federal level if state programs are 
insufficient to encourage more demand side participation and competition in 
wholesale electricity markets.116 Further, Order 745 neither eliminates nor preempts 
state DR programs, and the Supreme Court has empowered FERC to regulate the 
grid in similar situations of intertwined federal and state jurisdiction, which is 
discussed in Part III.117 
III. ECONOMIC NEED FOR DR IN WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 
A 2012 final rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(“EPA”) is scheduled to impose strict mercury and air toxics standards on power 
plants, including some of the costliest regulations ever passed under the authority 
of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).118 The new standards will apply to at least 600 
                                                          
113 Id. at 63 n.162 (stating that “the test is to determine where: (Delta LMP x MWh consumed) > 
(LMPNEW x DR); where LMPNEW is the price before DR is dispatched minus the market clearing 
price after DR is dispatched”). 
114 Eisen, supra note 15, at 72. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 73. 
117 Id.; see New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
118 Jessica Coomes, D.C. Circuit Upholds Key EPA Air Rule Setting Mercury Standards for 
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power plants in the United States, and the EPA has estimated the rule will cost the 
power industry $9.6 billion annually to reach compliance.119 
The cost-effective solution to managing future shortfalls in electricity supply 
is to create a uniform compensation and regulatory scheme to promote DR 
resources, and build upon the updated grid infrastructure to ensure DR reaches its 
full potential as an additional form of energy generation. Yet, FirstEnergy is 
attempting to remove approximately $9 billion in electricity supply from the Mid-
Atlantic PJM grid by removing DR resources from PJM’s annual capacity 
auction.120 A scenario analysis conducted by the independent market monitor for 
the PJM region estimated that if all DR offers were removed from PJM’s 2013 
annual capacity auction, consumers would have paid $10 billion more to procure 
the same amount of energy.121 In sum, the cost to comply with new regulations will 
cost the traditional power industry $9.6 billion annually, while the added benefit of 
DR resources in 2013 was equivalent to $9 billion worth of electricity supply and 
approximately $10 billion in savings for consumers. The clear solution to these 
perilous conditions in the traditional electricity supply market is to encourage and 
add as much DR to the grid as possible in upcoming years. 
A. The Value of DR Resources to RTOs 
Managing new generation and efficiency is vital to PJM because there is 
currently a massive fuel transition in the PJM market as many coal-fired plants 
retire and natural gas becomes a larger part of the generation mix.122 As of the end 
2013, proposed new generation sources in the PJM demonstrated a transition from 
coal to natural gas: 118 proposed natural gas projects were under consideration by 
PJM, compared with 73 for wind, and only six for coal.123 As coal-fired plants 
retire, the market will be challenged to match supply and demand, and total 
generational capacity may be unpredictable, which is a catastrophic problem in the 
most capital-intensive major industry in the United States.124 DR requires less 
capital and infrastructure than other forms of generation and it may be dispatched 
                                                          
119 Id. (referencing 77 Fed. Reg. 9,304 (Feb. 16, 2012)). 
120 Bruce W. Radford, $9 Billion at Risk, PUBLIC UTILITY FORTNIGHTLY, Nov. 2014, at 4. 
121 PJM petition for rehearing en banc, supra note 3, at 6–9. 
122 PJM 2013 Annual Report, supra note 73, at 14. 
123 Id. 
124 DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY, SECURITY, AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN 
WORLD 401 (2011). 
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quickly to smooth inefficiencies in the market.125 Because new construction and 
updates to existing infrastructure for traditional coal-fired plants are intensive, 
consumers necessarily suffer during the lag time between market signals of 
infrastructure deficiencies and the completion of infrastructure improvements, 
prompted new regulations or supply shortages.126 
In the last annual capacity auction for the 2016-2017 delivery year, record 
amounts of new generation and capacity imports were committed to meet the 
demands of the PJM region.127 The forward-capacity auction secured 169,000 total 
megawatts for future service by PJM; including 5,400 megawatts of new 
generation, 7,483 megawatts of capacity imports, 12,400 megawatts of demand 
response, and 1,117 megawatts of energy-efficiency resources.128 Thus, PJM 
depends upon DR resources to contribute approximately 7% of capacity and more 
than double the amount of new generation that will be added to the grid in 2016–
2017. 
In 2012, PJM invested $4.7 billion in transmission upgrades to address 
reliability impacts of generation retirements, and the PJM Board of Trustees 
approved an additional $5.8 billion to address fuel transition and grid stabilization 
in 2013.129 Further, through the support of matching SGIG funding from the DOE, 
PJM is working to increase synchrophasor placement on the grid, with PJM 
reporting that the industry is deploying these revolutionary units by the 
thousands.130 These synchrophasors provide real-time measurement of electrical 
quantities from across the power system.131 Synchrophasor units improve grid-
monitoring capability and communicate warnings of grid instability to PJM more 
quickly, which is a critical tool in the fight to mitigate the risk of blackouts or 
brownouts.132 The device coordinates GPS-satellite tracking of electrical quantities 
at key junctions on the grid and sends the data 90 times faster than current 
                                                          
125 Id. at 401–02 (“A new coal plant may cost as much as $3 billion, if it can be built in the face of 
environmental opposition and carbon regulation. A new nuclear plant may be double that—$6 billion or 
$7 billion or even more. Assuming the nuclear plant can make its way through the permitting process, it 
can take a decade or two to site and build.”). 
126 Fershee, supra note 56, at 350. 
127 PJM 2013 Annual Report, supra note 73, at 14. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 15. 
130 Id. at 24. 
131 Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Synchrophasors Overview, available at https://www 
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transmission monitoring devices.133 The data is read by phasor measurement units, 
which can show system changes that would not be revealed with conventional 
monitoring technology.134 
DR has become a major contributor to the PJM system’s need for capacity.135 
On September 11, 2013, PJM called on and received approximately 5,949 
megawatts of DR resources, which represented the largest amount of DR that PJM 
has ever dispatched in a single day.136 This increase in DR resources helped address 
the imbalance between supply and demand caused by unusually hot weather and 
local equipment problems that created emergency conditions in four states.137 In 
many respects, this is the behavior FERC sought to encourage when it issued Order 
745.138 Traditional power generators, on the other hand, oppose DR because the 
timing of its dispatch coincides with the highest demand for power, i.e. when 
supply from traditional generation is most profitable. 
DR is more than just an efficient means to supply new generation to the grid; 
it is an invaluable resource for the wholesale power market. Currently, there are no 
viable means of large-scale storage to regulate unexpected demand fluctuations on 
the grid.139 A recent FERC analysis demonstrates that DR could play an important 
role in maintaining frequency regulation on the grid, which is the most efficient 
way to handle the national fuel transition away from coal.140 Further, DR is 
dispatchable immediately and does not suffer from the time lag that occurs when a 
grid operator orders the startup of a power plant.141 Large-scale deployment of DR 
provides RTOs with a tool to respond quickly to changes in generation capacity 
                                                          
133 Matthew L. Wald, For the Smart Grid, a Synchophasor, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2010), available 
at http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/for-the-smart-grid-a-synchophasor/?_php=true&_type= 
blogs&_r=0 (Oct. 23, 2014, 10:00 PM) (referencing speeds of data monitoring at 90 times the current 
monitoring rates; a change from “a report once every two to four seconds, which is an eternity in the 
world of the high-voltage grid. The synchrophasors will report back 30 times a second.”). 
134 PJM 2013 Annual Report, supra note 73, at 25. 
135 PJM petition for rehearing en banc, supra note 3, at 6. 
136 ASSESSMENT, supra note 86, at 12–13. 
137 Id. 
138 PJM petition for rehearing en banc, supra note 3, at 6. 
139 Eisen, supra note 15, at 80. 
140 Id. (citing North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Accommodating High Levels of 
Variable Generation, at i (2009), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/ivgtf_report_041609.pdf). 
141 Id. 
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needs, without placing undue strain on the power system.142 Thus, it is a more 
efficient way to generate power than traditional methods. 
B. Technological Developments for DR in the Private Sector 
Empowering all electricity consumers, industrial and residential alike, to 
reduce consumption in response to price signals could be enormously beneficial.143 
Investments in smart grid development and DR have created new business 
opportunities in the private sector that did not exist 15 years ago. Boston-based 
EnerNOC, founded in 2001, uses advanced energy intelligence software (“EIS”) to 
function as a virtual power plant; adding supply to the grid through pooled 
reductions in electricity consumption from commercial, institutional, industrial, and 
residential consumers.144 DR aggregators pay electricity consumers for these 
voluntary reductions in power use, on top of the cost reduction achieved by 
decreased energy use.145 For the most part, DR aggregators, like EnerNOC, deliver 
cost savings and provide revenue for industrial consumers, but the prospects for 
residential DR are beginning to materialize and serve as the next frontier for two-
way electricity pricing and regional electricity network development.146 In 
December 2014, the confirmed DR participation in PJM by segment consisted of 
48% from the industrial/manufacturing sector and 16% from the residential 
sector.147 Approximately 22% of national DR capacity is from residential 
customers.148 According to a 2014 Government Accountability Report, residential 
DR remains a key source of untapped potential.149 DR activities from residential 
consumers would be particularly important because residential consumers are 
responsible for a large share of peak demand.150 
                                                          
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 83. 
144 See ENERNOC, supra note 26. 
145 Id. 
146 James McAnany, 2014 Demand Response Operations Market Activity Report: December 2014 
(Dec. 9, 2014), Figure 3: DY 14/15 Confirmed Load Management DR Registrations Business Segments, 
http://www.pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/dsr/2014-demand-response-activity-report.ashx. 
147 Id. 
148 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-73, DEMAND-RESPONSE ACTIVITIES HAVE 
INCREASED, BUT FERC COULD IMPROVE DATA COLLECTION AND REPORTING EFFORTS 31 (2014), 
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Most residential customers cannot interact directly with the wholesale 
markets, as market rules in RTOs and ISOs require small-scale customers to 
transact with regional grid operators and licensed intermediaries.151 New 
opportunities for delivering DR services to consumers have developed a market for 
residential DR.152 By pooling demand reductions from a number of energy 
consumers, a DR aggregator enables individual residential consumers to participate 
in the wholesale electricity market when they otherwise could not do so and assists 
in lowering overall electricity costs because of increased data on consumer 
behavior and market statistics.153 
Over time, firms that specialize in data analytics may become adept at parsing 
through the massive data that smart meters generate and develop a market to 
compete with utilities for a share of electricity sales via DR.154 Experts believe if 
market conditions are encouraged, entrepreneurs may eventually make more 
effective use of the smart grid than utilities.155 Software companies working with 
advanced algorithms might be in the best position to profit from the modern smart 
grid.156 Additionally, DR aggregators may have advantages over utilities in 
bringing about demand reductions and bridging the gap between consumers and 
grid operators through marketing strategies involving customer outreach and social 
media platforms.157 
Leading technology companies, such as Google, have demonstrated a strong 
interest in building a portfolio devoted to clean-tech and smart meter technology 
for home use.158 In the near future, technology companies may play an equally 
important role as traditional electric utilities in providing energy services through 
                                                          
151 Eisen, supra note 15, at 81. 
152 Jeff St. John, Ohmconnect Debuts New Demand Response Model, GREENTECHGRID (Sept. 29, 
2014), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Ohmconnects-Home-Energy-to-Grid-Connection-
is-a-New-Demand-Response-Model. 
153 Eisen, supra note 15, at 81. 
154 Id. at 12. 
155 Id. at 13. 
156 Id. at 13. 
157 Id. at 100; see also St. John, supra note 152 (referencing social media influenced aspects of 
Ohmconnect’s customer platform). 
158 Carlos Watson, Three Takeaways from Google’s Purchase of Nest, USA TODAY (Jan. 22, 
2014, 3:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/01/22/google-buys-nest-labs/ 
4778693. 
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the use of data analytics and DR programs.159 In January 2014, Google acquired 
Nest Labs (“Nest”), a manufacturer of smart thermostats and smoke alarms, for 
$3.2 billion.160 Nest now sells its product across North America and in Britain.161 
Nest was founded by ex-Apple executive Tony Fadell in 2010, whose prior work 
included development of the iPod.162 
Nest is primarily a system that encourages people to save energy and money 
in a user-friendly manner.163 The Nest thermostat auto-schedules itself to adjust the 
temperature when one is outside the home as well as allows the temperature to be 
adjusted via a smart phone app.164 During Nest “Rush Hour Rewards” programs, 
customers receive notice of a two-to-four hour time period in the next day market 
where a reduction in electricity demand results in a payment from Nest.165 These 
rush hour events are the future of the residential DR market and the example 
demonstrates the potential benefits of real-time electricity pricing and two-way 
communication technology, a feature only made available because of the modern 
technological advancements and taxpayer funding that created the smart grid. 
Ohmconnect, a San Francisco-based start-up, combines Wi-Fi controlled 
devices, such as the Nest thermostat, with utility market signals to notify customers 
of OhmHour events that prompt the consumer to reduce energy use in exchange for 
points which are redeemable for cash via PayPal or Venmo deposits.166 DR 
aggregators like Ohmconnect then deliver DR resources to the wholesale grid.167 
These new firms aggregate consumer’s reductions in demand and offer a large 
portion for sale in the wholesale energy markets.168 
                                                          
159 H. Russell Frisby, Jr. & Jonathan P. Trotta, The Smart Grid: The Complexities and Importance 
of Data Privacy and Security, 19 COMM LAW CONSPECTUS 297, 298 (2011). 
160 Rolfe Winkler & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google to Buy Nest Labs for $3.2 Billion, WALL ST. 
J. (Jan. 13, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303595404579318952802236612. 
161 New Business Models, All Change: The Power Industry’s Main Concern Has Always Been 
Supply. Now It Is Learning to Manage Demand, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 17, 2015), http://www 
.economist.com/news/special-report/21639019-power-industrys-main-concern-has-always-been-supply-
now-it-learning-manage. 
162 Winkler & Wakabayashi, supra note 160. 
163 Watson, supra note 158. 
164 Nest Learning Thermostat 2nd Generation: Overview, http://store.apple.com/us/product/ 
HA895LL/A/nest-learning-thermostat-2nd-generation (last visited Oct. 20, 2014, 11:00 PM). 
165 Id. 
166 St. John, supra note 152. 
167 Eisen, supra note 1, at 11. 
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An increase in private sector DR services would create a historic shift in the 
electricity system and open up far more consumer interaction on the demand side, 
loosening the control that utilities and grid operators have over the supply of 
electricity.169 As consumers become more familiar with the services DR 
aggregators provide, they will better understand how energy-saving technologies 
can redefine the existing market for electricity.170 If permitted to stand, the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision to vacate Order 745 will stifle growth in the private sector and 
prevent increased competition and fairness in wholesale electricity markets. At 
present, inefficiencies arise in the wholesale markets due to limited opportunity for 
resources on the demand side to adjust preferences for electricity consumption as 
well as barriers to entry for DR aggregators and an overall lack of information in 
wholesale electricity markets. 
C. Supply Considerations in the Market for Electric Power 
In 2012, the EPA finalized the National Emissions Standards for Hazardous 
Air Pollutants (“NESHAPs”) for coal and oil fired electric utility steam generating 
units.171 The rule imposes the first federal limits on a number of formerly non-
regulated hazardous air pollutants from power plant emissions and requires overall 
reductions in mercury emissions of 90% as well as reductions in acid gases and 
other air toxins, known as mercury air and toxins standards.172 The 2012 NESHAP 
standards confirmed the agency’s findings dating back to 2000, following a 
recommendation to add a number of hazardous air pollutants emitted by coal and 
oil fired power plants to a source list under EPA authority, pursuant to § 112(c) of 
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”).173 In support of its findings, the EPA relied on 
§ 112(n)(1)(A) of the CAA, which requires the EPA to study how power plant 
emissions affect public health and gives the agency authority to regulate power 
plants if it finds that doing so is appropriate and necessary.174 In April 2014, the 
D.C. Circuit approved the NESHAP regulation as appropriate and necessary.175 
                                                          
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 White Stallion Energy Center v. EPA, 748 F.3d 1222, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 
135 S. Ct. 702 (2014). 
172 Carrie Jenks & Kathy Robertson, D.C. Circuit Upholds Mercury and Air Toxic Standards 
(MATS) for Existing Sources, M.J. BRADLEY & ASSOCIATES, 1 (Apr. 16, 2014), http://www.mjbradley 
.com/sites/default/files/MJBA%20Issue%20Brief%20-%20EGU%20MACT%20Decision%2016 
April2014.pdf. 
173 White Stallion, 748 F.3d at 1229. 
174 Id. at 1240. 
175 Id. 
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Using EPA-based data modeling, the Institute for Energy Research estimates 
that 72 gigawatts of electrical generation capacity will retire because of the 
NESHAP regulations.176 To put 72 gigawatts in perspective, it matches the capacity 
needed to power 44.7 million homes, or every home in every state west of the 
Mississippi River excluding Texas.177 Since coal is the single largest source of 
electricity generation in the United States, the ability to meet future electricity 
generation supply needs will require the construction of new generation facilities 
and massive infrastructure improvements.178 As a result, policy measures to 
promote regulatory and technological developments in non-traditional power 
generation, such as DR, are critical at the present moment and should be valued 
equally or higher than traditional generation resources.179 
IV. D.C. CIRCUIT RULING TO VACATE FERC ORDER 745 AND THE 
IMPLICATIONS FOR RTOS 
As mentioned previously, in May 2014, the D.C. Circuit held 2-1 that FERC 
exceeded its authority in promulgating Order 745.180 The court vacated the rule in 
its entirety as an ultra vires agency action because the rule encroached on the 
states’ exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the retail market.181 The petitioner in the 
action, Electric Power Supply Association (“EPSA”), represents approximately 480 
electricity generation facilities in 40 states and Washington D.C.182 EPSA argued 
that FERC has no authority to draw customers into retail markets by paying them, 
or incentivizing them not to make retail purchases, through a DR program.183 
In opposition, FERC argued that when retail customers voluntarily participate 
in the wholesale market through DR aggregators they fall within FERC’s exclusive 
                                                          
176 INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, IMPACT OF EPA’S REGULATORY ASSAULT ON POWER PLANTS: 
NEW REGULATIONS TO TAKE MORE THAN 72 GW OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION OFFLINE AND THE 
PLANT CLOSING ANNOUNCEMENTS KEEP COMING, 1 (2014), available at instituteforenergyresearch.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Power-Plant-Updates-Final.pdf. 
177 Id. 
178 INST. FOR ENERGY RESEARCH, supra note 176, at 1. 
179 Eisen, supra note 15, at 77. 
180 See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
181 Id. at 225. 
182 What is EPSA, EPSA: The Electric Power Supply Association, https://www.espa.org/about 
(last visited Feb. 19, 2015, 12:00 AM). 
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jurisdiction over rates affecting the wholesale market.184 FERC rooted its argument 
in two provisions of the FPA. First, FERC argued that § 201 of the FPA empowers 
it to regulate “the sale of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce,” 
which includes DR aggregators.185 Second, pursuant to §§ 205 and 206 of the FPA, 
FERC argued it had authority to regulate DR because the sale of DR resources 
directly affects wholesale rates for electricity.186 
The majority rejected the argument that DR is a sale of electricity, holding 
that FERC cannot have jurisdiction over DR pursuant to § 201 alone.187 The court 
stated, “[DR] resources do not actually sell into the market. [DR] does not involve 
a sale, and the resources ‘participate’ only by declining to act.”188 Additionally, the 
majority held that FERC’s jurisdiction under §§ 205 and 206 is insufficient to 
confer jurisdiction over the market for DR.189 FERC argued that reductions in retail 
consumption lower the wholesale price of electricity because the forgone energy is 
redistributed to the grid by DR aggregators, who serve as direct participants in the 
wholesale energy market.190 The majority disagreed, finding DR to be a retail sale 
that is subject to regulation by the states, not the federal government.191 
The court conceded that DR affects the wholesale market for electricity based 
on the zero-sum nature of a mixed retail-to-wholesale transaction, stating, “[A] 
change in one market will inevitably beget a change in the other.”192 The majority 
held that the congressional intent is articulated within the “specific limits” of § 201, 
which confers FERC’s jurisdiction “only to those matters which are not subject to 
regulation by the states,” specifically sale of electric power directly to the retail 
consumer.193 The court found that DR is not exclusively a retail sale of energy, but 
                                                          
184 Id. 
185 Id. at 233; see 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012). 
186 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 221. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. (emphasis in original). 
189 Id. at 222. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 232. 
192 Id. at 221. 
193 Id. at 222 (citing Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. FERC, 452 F.3d 822, 824 (D.C. Cir. 
2006)). 
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it is indeed part of the retail market, therefore the authority over DR falls within the 
jurisdiction of the states.194 
The court found the broad language of §§ 205 and 206 does not erase the 
specific limits of § 201, and FERC’s interpretation of §§ 205 and 206 would have 
no limiting principle.195 The majority held that if §§ 205 and 206 permit FERC to 
regulate the non-sale of power, a fortiori FERC could extend its authority to 
“regulate any number of areas, including the steel, fuel, and labor markets.”196 This 
logic drastically oversimplifies the problem FERC sought to address with Order 
745 and fails to properly consider the scope of the regulatory action on interstate 
markets. After the decision, PJM joined FERC to file a petition for rehearing en 
banc before the D.C. Circuit, but the D.C. Circuit denied the petition on 
September 17, 2014.197 
A. A Proper Interpretation of the FPA Grants FERC Jurisdiction over 
DR 
The D.C. Circuit interpreted FERC’s authority under the FPA too narrowly. 
In a convincing dissent, Senior Circuit Judge Harry Edwards argued that Order 745 
requires deference to agency expertise in determining the appropriate pricing 
mechanism and compensation level used to incentivize the sale of DR resources in 
the wholesale market.198 The dissent accurately described the scope and 
significance of the inefficiencies Order 745 sought to correct and rightly found 
FERC jurisdiction over DR in wholesale markets.199 First, the dissent explained 
that electricity is a unique commodity in that it cannot be stored for later use; and 
the dispatch of electricity requires a continual, contemporaneous matching of 
supply to meet demand.200 Second, Judge Edwards posited that not all power plants 
are created equal, as some are efficient and cost less, while others are inefficient 
and expensive.201 Third, the dissent stated that a majority of retail consumers are 
                                                          
194 Id. at 222 n.1. 
195 Id. at 221. 
196 Id. 
197 FERC petition for cert., supra note 7. 
198 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 238 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
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charged a fixed price for electricity that does not adjust to the cost of producing 
electricity.202 
The critical issue in the EPSA case is the federalism tension between FERC 
and state public utility agencies to regulate electricity rates and the added 
complexity third-party DR aggregators bring to the situation.203 In its brief filed 
before the D.C. Circuit, FERC argued that its affecting jurisdiction can be 
appropriately limited to direct participants in the wholesale energy markets, and 
Order 745 will not disrupt the federalism tension over wholesale electric sales.204 In 
the United States, any electricity that enters the grid immediately becomes part of a 
vast pool of energy that is constantly moving in interstate commerce.205 The D.C. 
Circuit should not have limited the ability of FERC to exercise its Congressional 
authority in promulgating Order 745, because the rule directly affects wholesale 
electric markets that are closely tied to the national interest for the following 
reasons: national security, economic productivity, health considerations, and social 
welfare from increased competition.206 
Additionally, Order 745 does not infringe upon the rights of the states to 
regulate DR; rather, Order 745 does not require anything of retail electricity 
consumers and leaves it to the states to decide whether to permit DR within 
intrastate electricity markets.207 The dissent in EPSA correctly noted that Order 745 
preserves state regulation over retail markets and carves out exceptions whereby 
ISOs and RTOs will not always be required to compensate DR resources at the 
LMP because of the net benefits test.208 
B. FERC Jurisdiction Upheld in Similar Situations of Mixed Federal-
State Jurisdiction 
The following two cases demonstrate that FERC’s authority to regulate the 
wholesale market is generally construed broadly by courts in situations of mixed 
federal-state jurisdiction. In Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control v. 
FERC, the D.C. Circuit ruled that FERC had the authority to raise the installed 
                                                          
202 Id. 
203 See generally Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
204 Id. at 221. 
205 New York, 553 U.S. at 32 (U.S. 2002) (Thomas, J. dissenting). 
206 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 236 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
207 Id. 
208 Id. (see explanation of the net benefits test, discussed herein at 175–76). 
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capacity requirement (“ICR”)209 in the New England-ISO (“NE-ISO”), the New 
England power grid, because it was a practice affecting rates at wholesale, pursuant 
to § 206 of the FPA.210 In New York v. FERC, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
FERC did not overstep its authority by forcing utility providers to unbundle 
transactions that consist of mixed generation and transmission services.211 
1. Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control v. FERC 
The D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Connecticut is blatantly inconsistent with its 
ruling in EPSA. In Connecticut, the court acknowledged the benefit of DR to match 
supply needs in the NE-ISO market in 2009; however, it rejected FERC’s attempt 
to develop a market mechanism to promote the use of DR resources to meet 
capacity shortages in the PJM market in 2014. In EPSA, the D.C. Circuit denied 
FERC the authority to mandate that RTOs and ISOs compensate DR resources at 
the same price as generation, as long as certain conditions were met. As the dissent 
in EPSA stated, “This is hardly the stuff of grand agency overreach.”212 FERC 
Order 745 incorporates a number of contingencies that determine whether or not 
DR resources are compensated at the LMP, including state regulations over DR213 
and a net benefits test that is calculated by participating ISOs and RTOs.214 
Therefore, the D.C. Circuit diverged significantly from the its prior interpretation 
of FERC authority under the FPA in its consideration of Order 745 and it should 
have supported Order 745 for its ability to promote competitive bidding in the 
                                                          
209 Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 481 (C.A.D.C. 2009) (the 
Court explained “The ‘Installed Capacity Requirement’ is misnamed because increasing it doesn’t 
actually ‘require’ anyone to ‘install’ any new ‘capacity’ at all . . . the ICR is better understood not as a 
capacity requirement but as something more like a peak demand estimate (PDE)-perhaps, in FERC-
speak, a PDE-and the purpose of the Forward Market is only to locate the price at which market 
incentives will be sufficient to meet that expected demand.”). 
210 Id. at 485. 
211 Eisen, supra note 15, at 103. 
212 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 233. 
213 Id. at 232–33 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (stating that “the regulation’s requirement that ISOs 
and RTOs accept bids from [DR] resources comes with a key caveat: the requirement applies ‘unless not 
permitted by the laws or regulations of the relevant electric regulatory authority.’ Id. 
§ 35.28(g)(1)(i)(A); see also id. § 35.28(g)(1)(iii). In other words, there is a carve-out from the 
compensation requirement for ISOs and RTOs in States where local regulatory law stands in the way. 
Thus, the Order preserves State regulation of retail markets. This is hardly the stuff of grand agency 
overreach.” (citation omitted)). 
214 Id. at 233–34 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“All Order 745 says is that if a State’s laws permit 
[DR] to be bid into electricity markets, and if a [DR] resource affirmatively decides to participate in an 
ISO’s or RTO’s wholesale electricity market, and if that [DR] resource would in a particular 
circumstance allow the ISO or RTO to balance wholesale supply and demand, and if paying that [DR] 
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power supply market and prioritize more efficient generation resources that 
dispatch electricity at a lower cost. 
In Connecticut, D.C. Circuit held that FERC did not overstep its jurisdictional 
authority when it increased the ICR of the NE-ISO, even though the ICR is “a key 
input into the market-based mechanism that determines transmission tariffs and 
end-user costs in the New England bulk power system.”215 In opposition, the 
Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control (“CT PUC”) argued that FERC’s 
review of the ICR established capacity increases that would incentivize the 
construction of new generation facilities; a matter explicitly subject to state 
control.216 The Connecticut court disagreed and the court ruled that additional 
capacity requirements may incentivize the procurement of additional resources, 
including new generation facilities, but the states retain their ultimate authority 
over the construction of new facilities and could determine the appropriate way to 
meet the requirements.217 
The CT PUC conceded that FERC and the NE-ISO could directly set the price 
of capacity at a level to incentivize the procurement of resources to meet their 
estimate of peak demand.218 However, the procurement of resources does not 
necessarily order the construction of new generation facilities.219 Therefore, the 
peak demand estimate is necessarily tied to prices, but it is not necessarily tied to 
new capacity construction.220 
The court held explicitly that FERC’s jurisdiction over wholesale rates and 
transmission includes the authority to review tariff elements, such as capacity, 
because of its impact on wholesale rates.221 The court reasoned that decisions about 
capacity affect the pool of bidders in the forward market, which in turn affects the 
market clearing price for electricity.222 The court explained the correlation between 
capacity and price via an example: 
                                                          
215 Id. at 478–79 (emphasis added). 
216 Id. at 479. 
217 Id. at 481–82. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. at 482. 
220 Id. 
221 Petition of PJM Interconnection for Approval of Revisions to the Reliability Pricing Market 
(“RPM”) and Related Rules in the PJM Open Access Transmission Tariff (“Tariff”) and Reliability 
Assurance Agreement Among Load Serving Entities (“RAA”), at 10, FERC Docket No. ER15-852-000 
(Jan. 14, 2015) (citing CT PUC v. FERC, 569 F.3d 477, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
222 Connecticut Dept. of Pub. Util. Control, 569 F.3d at 481. 
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And in an extreme situation where local regulators 
utterly refused to allow creation of any new capacity to 
offset increases in the ICR, the price would rise towards 
the initial offering price of two times the cost of new 
entry. But this is all quite natural: if consumer-
constituents of state commissions prefer to forbid the 
construction of new power plants, they will 
appropriately bear the costs of that decision, including 
paying more for system reliability from older and less 
efficient units.223 
In essence, FERC sets the quantity required in a certain power market when it sets 
the ICR, with a specific threshold price in mind. But, FERC leaves the decision to 
the states and the NE-ISO to meet that peak demand estimate with whichever 
supply mix it chooses. By setting the ICR, FERC is effectively “setting a target for 
capacity demand and using a market mechanism to locate the price appropriate to 
that quantity.”224 The court found that regulators and grid operators have various 
means to respond to increases in the ICR besides construction of new capacity or 
paying escalating costs.225 There is a third option: DR.226 Thus, DR is referenced 
because of its ability to balance supply in the capacity market, and, consequently, 
balance the clearing price for power. The court validated FERC authority to set the 
ICR in order to promote competitive bidding in the NE-ISO from existing 
generators, new entrants, and demand-side resources.227 The court stated, “By using 
competitive bidding for future capacity contracts, this system both incentivizes and 
accounts for new entry by more efficient generators, while ensuring a price both 
adequate to support reliability and fair to consumers.”228 
The court’s interpretation of the FPA in Connecticut grants FERC much 
broader authority than Order 745, which merely orders RTOs and ISOs to establish 
a threshold price where grid operators may purchase supply from DR aggregators 
to stabilize the marginal price of electricity when demand unexpectedly exceeds 
                                                          
223 Id. 
224 Id. at 482. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. (stating that load servicing entities “may also seek capacity from interconnected utilities 
outside the New England power system or ‘demand response’ contracts where users are compensated 
for committing to use less electricity during shortages”). 
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supply.229 A critical factor in balancing supply in the PJM region is the PJM 
Region Reliability Requirement.230 The PJM Region Reliability Requirement 
functions similarly to the ICR, in that it establishes the target reserve level to be 
procured for the three-year forward capacity auction.231 PJM has secured over 
10,000 megawatts of DR resources for the summer peak season its three-year base 
residual auction beginning in 2015.232 If the D.C. Circuit’s ruling to vacate Order 
745 is allowed to stand, these resources will be squandered and the power supply 
market will have to adjust, forcing prices higher for energy consumers. 
2. New York v. FERC 
In New York, the Court ruled that FERC did not exceed its jurisdiction by 
including unbundled retail transmissions within the scope of a Final Rule issuance, 
Order 888, and that the FPA’s plain language readily supported FERC’s 
jurisdiction over the unbundled transmissions of electric energy for sale to retail 
consumers.233 In Order 888, FERC found that electric utilities were discriminating 
in the bulk power markets, in violation § 205 of the FPA, by providing either 
inferior access to their transmission networks or no access at all to third-party 
providers of services to the electricity industry.234 As a result, FERC ordered the 
functional unbundling of wholesale generation and transmission services, requiring 
each utility to set separate rates for its wholesale generation, transmission, and 
ancillary services.235 
The Supreme Court emphasized that the electricity industry has changed 
dramatically since the FPA was enacted in 1935, and the electricity universe is no 
longer neatly divided into spheres of retail versus wholesale transactions.236 With 
the enactment of the FPA, Congress authorized federal regulation not only of 
wholesale sales that had been beyond the reach of state power, but also the 
regulation of wholesale sales that had been previously subject to state regulation.237 
Additionally, the FPA authorized federal regulation over interstate transmissions of 
                                                          
229 See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d at 233–34 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
230 Petition of PJM Interconnection for Approval, supra note 221, at 10. 
231 Id. 
232 PJM petition for rehearing en banc, supra note 3, at 9. 
233 New York, 535 U.S. at 4. 
234 Id. at 11. 
235 Id. 
236 Id. at 16. 
237 Id. at 21 (emphasis in original). 
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electric power.238 In opposition of Order 888, New York argued that FERC 
improperly invaded the States’ authority over facilities used in local distribution.239 
The Court explained that Order 888 did not claim jurisdiction over local facilities, 
but merely provided a seven-factor test for identifying these facilities, without 
purporting to regulate them in their entirety.240 This multi-factor test in Order 888 
is akin to the net benefits test in Order 745. The net benefits test limits FERC’s 
authority over DR and it does not mandate that RTOs or ISOs include any specified 
amount of DR. 
Order 745 does not infringe on state jurisdiction of the retail market because a 
DR transaction applies only to sales of electric energy at wholesale. Similar to the 
unbundling of transmission services in New York, a DR transaction is a type of 
bundled transaction. A DR transaction begins with the pooling of non-sales of 
electricity that never reach the retail level simply because the power is not 
purchased by the retail consumer. Instead, the consumer voluntarily decides to 
reduce their power usage; therefore, the marginal non-utilized power remains on 
the grid. The ultimate consequence of dispatching DR resources to the grid 
increases wholesale supply to RTOs like PJM and the energy remains on the 
interstate grid, where it directly affects sale of electricity at wholesale and the 
clearing price for electric power. Thus, the effect on interstate rates is clearly more 
pronounced than any affect on intrastate rates when DR aggregators sell DR to grid 
operators who then purchase DR resources at the LMP. The Court in New York 
referenced an amicus brief that explains how electricity flows on the modern grid 
and it is helpful to understand why DR sales do not affect the sale of electricity at 
retail: 
As amici explain in less technical terms, “[e]nergy 
flowing onto a power network or gird energizes the 
entire grid, and consumers then draw undifferentiated 
energy from that grid” . . . . As a result, explain amici, 
any activity on the interstate grid affects the rest of the 
grid . . . Amici dispute the States’ contentions that 
electricity functions “the way water flows through a pipe 
or blood cells flow through a vein” and “can be 
controlled, directed and traced” as these substances can 
                                                          
238 Id. 
239 Id. at 22. 
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be, calling such metaphors “inaccurate and highly 
misleading.”241 
In New York, the majority determined that FERC had the authority to regulate 
a portion of a retail sale, the unbundling of the transmission of the sale of electric 
power, under both § 201 of the FPA as well as §§ 205 and 206, partly because the 
Court construes the language of the FPA broadly in close decisions.242 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the D.C. Circuit because FERC’s factual 
determinations were reasonable, and §§ 205 and 206 gave FERC the authority to 
prescribe a market-wide remedy for a market-wide problem.243 
FERC’s goal of removing barriers to entry in wholesale energy markets via 
Order 745 is strongly reflected in the Supreme Court’s 2002 ruling in New York.244 
In New York, FERC emphasized that the legal and policy cornerstone of Order 888 
is to “remedy undue discrimination in access to the monopoly owned transmission 
wires that control whether and to whom electricity can be transported in interstate 
commerce.”245 Moreover, FERC recognized the need to eliminate the use of 
monopoly power over the transmission of electricity and other components that 
comprise the sale of electric energy.246 The objective of FERC Order 745 aligns 
with FERC Order 888 in that both administrative orders support the agency’s 
mission is to foster competition in the wholesale market for power generation, 
reduce monopoly control, and promote the sale of electricity at its lowest cost.247 
The Court in New York held that in circumstances where the language of the 
FPA is ambiguous, the Court should defer to FERC’s interpretation of the key 
provisions of the FPA because of the technological complexities of national electric 
grids.248 It is unclear why the D.C. Circuit did not follow a similarly logical path in 
the EPSA decision, and the fallout from its ruling has created a jurisdictional 
quandary for PJM and other RTOs whose DR resources have been challenged by 
power companies within their generation and distribution networks. The Court 
                                                          
241 Id. at 8 (quoting the Brief for Electrical Engineers et al. as Amici Curiae at 2, 5). 
242 Id. at 15. 
243 New York, 535 U.S. at 14. 
244 Eisen, supra note 15, at 103. 
245 Id. at 35. 
246 Id. 
247 Eisen, supra note 15, at 72. 
248 Id. at 15. 
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must act to reverse the decision of the D.C. Circuit in accordance with precedent 
set in New York because the advantages of DR resources are felt on a national, 
market-wide scale, just as the unbundling of electricity transmission corrected a 
market-wide problem. 
C. FirstEnergy’s Challenge and Future Implications for RTOs like PJM 
Within hours of the EPSA v. FERC decision, First Energy filed a complaint 
before FERC seeking to remove DR resources from PJM’s 2014 capacity 
auction.249 Specifically, FirstEnergy requested “the removal of all portions of the 
PJM Tariff allowing or requiring PJM to include [DR] as suppliers to PJM’s 
capacity markets, with a refund effective date of May 23, 2014.”250 In its petition 
for rehearing en banc to the D.C. Circuit, PJM argued that DR is a major 
contributor to PJM’s need for capacity, and over the last ten years PJM and other 
grid operators have allowed voluntary DR commitments to compete alongside 
traditional generators for capacity needs.251 PJM argued that the holding in EPSA v. 
FERC poses a serious threat to the compensation model currently in place for DR 
resources, and calls into question the future of DR resources offered by DR 
aggregators, who have become increasingly more important in meeting supply 
needs on the grid in recent years.252 Variations in compensation paid to DR 
resources is a barrier to entry for DR aggregators because the advantage that DR 
has over other forms of electricity supply is the ability to dispatch megawatts faster 
and at a lower cost.253 
As a result of the D.C. Circuit ruling, there is substantial uncertainty whether 
PJM must now deny access to DR aggregators as suppliers in the wholesale market. 
Additionally, even if the resources are permitted, there is still question as to the 
appropriate level of compensation for DR resources procured by RTOs for 
redistribution at wholesale.254 In its petition for rehearing en banc, PJM explained 
that it would be a challenge to find a substitute for the over 8,000 megawatts of DR 
committed to manage the 2014 winter season.255 Similarly, PJM will be stressed to 
                                                          
249 Complaint of FirstEnergy Service Co., FERC Docket No. EL14-55-000 (May 23, 2014). 
250 Complaint of FirstEnergy Service Co., FERC Docket No. EL14-55-000, 1 (May Complaint of 
FirstEnergy Service Co., FERC Docket No. EL14-55-000, 1 (May 23, 2014)). 
251 PJM petition for rehearing en banc, supra note 3, at 6 (noting this has occurred “with FERC 
approval”). 
252 Id. at 4–5. 
253 Id. at 13–14. 
254 PJM petition for rehearing en banc, supra note 3, at 14. 




P R I O R I T I Z I N G  D E M A N D  R E S P O N S E  
Volume XV – Spring 2015 ● ISSN 2164-800X (online) 










find substitutes for the 10,000+ megawatts of DR that have been committed as 
capacity for each of the 2015, 2016, and 2017 peak seasons.256 Also in its petition, 
PJM argues that removing DR resources from its wholesale market will increase 
the clearing prices in the PJM market because DR offers tend to be made at a lower 
cost than offers from traditional generation resources.257 
In the present wholesale market, DR competes with traditional methods of 
generation to meet the various reliability needs described above, and the additional 
supply competition is an effective way to mitigate price increases.258 Removing DR 
resources from the grid will hinder competition and impede efficiency in the 
wholesale market, which is particularly challenging in this unprecedented period of 
transition away from coal-fired power generation.259 The fact that the largest grid 
operator in the United States opposes the D.C. Circuit’s ruling on Order 745 with 
such vigor is strong evidence that DR resources are a valuable part of the wholesale 
market for electricity and should fall under FERC’s jurisdiction. 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
On May 4, 2015, the Supreme Court granted FERC’s petition for certiorari 
on appeal from the EPSA v. FERC decision.260 In close cases of mixed state-federal 
jurisdiction, the Court has construed the language of the FPA broadly and they 
should do the same in FERC v. EPSA.261 The Court should interpret the FPA more 
broadly than the D.C. Circuit and grant FERC federal ratemaking authority over 
DR because the transaction affects the wholesale market more significantly than 
the retail market. Additionally, the Supreme Court must consider the legal and 
policy reasons for a broad interpretation of the FPA, including: the encouragement 
of technological developments in the electricity industry, removing barriers to entry 
in electricity markets, and promoting competition for rates in the wholesale 
market.262 Additionally, Supreme Court precedent supports federal measures to 
                                                          
256 Id. 
257 Id. at 13. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 575 U.S. 
__ (U.S. May 4, 2014) (No. 14-840). 
261 New York, 535 U.S. at 15. 
262 Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. F.E.R.C., 753 F.3d 216, 238–39 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Edwards, J., 
dissenting). 
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remove competition in the electricity supply industry.263 DR resources should be 
compensated at the same level as traditional generation, in accordance with FERC 
Order 745, to promote the development of the smart grid and the market for DR 
aggregators. 
In total, the Court should permit Order 745 to stand. First, Order 745 was 
enacted in 2011 and DR technology is only now beginning to reach its full 
potential. The billions of dollars invested by the federal government and the private 
sector to build the smart grid and promote technological progress through programs 
like DR is squarely within the country’s national interest. Secondly, the D.C. 
Circuit’s decision injects tremendous uncertainty into the federal-state balance of 
authority over wholesale electricity markets, which could cost energy consumers 
millions of dollars in additional costs and lead to electricity supply shortages. 
Lastly, other federal programs are aligned with the promotion of cleaner and more 
environmentally conscious forms of power generation and consumption. Therefore, 
FERC should be able to work in coordination with the EPA and the DOE to 
promote energy generation that will improve air quality and combat the health and 
societal challenges related to generation from inefficient power sources. 
                                                          
263 See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002). 
